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The Impending Demise of the WTO Appellate 
Body: From Centrepiece to Historical Relic? 
Markus Wagner, University of Wollongong 
Abstract: The current crisis engulfing the multilateral trading system has crystalized 
in the dispute over the (re-)appointment of the members of the World Trade 
Organization’s Appellate Body. While the legislative arm of the organization has 
never lived up to its potential, its dispute settlement arm with the Appellate Body at 
its apex was seen as a lodestar for other international courts and tribunals. The United 
States has taken issue not only with individual decisions of the Appellate Body (as 
well as individual Appellate Body members), but with the institution as such. The 
article recounts the important institutional redesign that has led to the Appellate Body 
becoming the World Trade Organization’s institutional “centerpiece”. These very 
same developments are now destined to lead to the Appellate Body’s downfall with 
potential reverberations for the entire World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement 
process. Moreover, it threatens the institution as a whole, unless some last minute 
compromise can be found between various competing visions of global economic 
governance. 
Key words: World Trade Organization (WTO), Appellate Body, dispute settlement, 
international trade, trade, multilateralism 
1. Introduction  
Shortly after the creation of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO) the 
newly created Appellate Body (hereinafter AB) started to occupy a position of 
centrality in the governance of international trade law. Through its position at the 
apex of WTO dispute settlement (unforeseen at the time of its creation), its 
jurisprudence concerning non-economic values, and its realization of the importance 
of open and more transparent processes the AB has contributed greatly towards 
improving the legitimacy of the WTO in general and the dispute settlement pillar in 
particular.  
The current impasse over the appointments (or lack thereof) for vacant positions on 
the AB threatens to relegate its remarkable success story to a historical footnote. The 
article shows how the AB developed from an afterthought to the “centrepiece” in 
WTO governance and how the current situation threatens not only the dispute 
settlement mechanism within the organization, but also wider trade governance. The 
article recounts the development of the dispute settlement process under the GATT 
(Part two), highlights how the AB currently occupies a central position within the 
WTO (Part three), before turning to the criticism leveled against the AB by the United 
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States (hereinafter US) as well as other WTO Members’ responses (Part four). Part 
five offers concluding thoughts.  
2. Dispute Settlement in the GATT Years  
The GATT dispute settlement process operated not only without an appellate 
mechanism, but its dispute settlement mechanism was—at least in comparison to that 
of the WTO—rudimentary. Articles XXII and XXIII GATT formed the basis for 
dispute settlement but did not mention the term dispute and it could even be argued 
from the wording of these provisions that adjudicatory proceedings were not 
contemplated at the outset. Article XXIII GATT provides that in cases of nullification 
or impairment (read: at least violation of the GATT1), “the contracting party may […] 
make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties 
[…]”. The only concrete obligation for the addressee laid down in this provision is 
that “[a]ny contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to 
the representations or proposals made to it.”2 Given the scant provision for formal 
dispute settlement, the GATT’s resulting dispute settlement process was remarkable 
for both its widespread use and track record.3 That said, the GATT dispute settlement 
process suffered serious shortcomings – at least from today’s perspective: the 
establishment of panels and the adoption of reports could be blocked, which in 
essence meant that at least in the beginning it was hard to call the GATT dispute 
settlement process an independent legal system. This was best expressed by Robert 
Hudec who famously characterized the GATT dispute settlement process as “a 
diplomat’s concept of legal order. At least, that is the way it started out.”4 After a 
promising start, dispute settlement under the GATT feel into disuse during the 1960s5 
and was only resurrected in the 1970s and 1980s. The DISC cases—a series of 
disputes involving subsidies—laid bare the need for reform beyond what GATT 
Contracting Parties had agreed to in the Tokyo Round Agreement on Dispute 
Settlement.6 What emerged during that time was a proto-legal system with a legal 
division within the GATT Secretariat in the early 1980s which led to a higher degree 
of consistency among the dispute settlement reports and a higher degree of 
proceduralization of the dispute settlement process. 7  The subsequent discussions 
identified the consensus requirement—including the party that lost the case—as a 
major obstacle, as a negative vote would frustrate the entire purpose of the dispute 
                                                            
1 Jackson (1998), p. 67. 
2 Article XXIII:1 GATT. A similar provision exists with respect to the consultation stage, see Article 
XXII:1 GATT.  
3 See Hudec et al. (1993), p. 1–113. The authors call the GATT dispute settlement “accomplishments 
[…], if not unique, are at least rare in the history of international legal institutions”, see id. at p. 97. 
See also Jackson, supra note 1, at p. 64. 
4 Hudec (1993), p. 7; Davey (1987), p. 61.See generally Reich (1997), pp. 775–849.  
5 Hudec, supra note 4, at pp. 31–34. 
6 For an overview of the disputes, see Jackson (1978). See also Hudec, supra note 4, at pp. 53–57, 
130. 
7 Hudec, supra note 4, at pp. 137–138. 
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settlement system. Problems connected with expertise, blockage, delays, 
fragmentation and implementation hampered effective dispute settlement in the 
GATT years. This found expression in the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, 
which urged that “[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to 
the benefit of all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen 
the rules and the procedures of the dispute settlement process […]”.8 
3. The WTO Dispute Settlement System’s Central Reforms: 
Reasons for Its Downfall  
It is well-known that the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (hereinafter 
DSU) changed the dispute settlement process considerably. Because a full 
examination of the manifold changes is beyond the scope of this Chapter, the 
following section will highlight institutional changes brought about through the DSU 
as well as some more evolutionary modifications of the dispute settlement process.   
3.1 Institutional Changes  
Among the most important institutional changes are what has come to be known 
as reverse consensus as well as the very creation of the AB composed of individuals 
who hold their positions for once-renewable four-year terms.  
3.1.1 Reverse Consensus 
One of the characteristics that hampered the GATT dispute settlement process 
was that a government was able to block not only the creation of a dispute settlement 
panel, but could block the adoption of the report. This gave the losing party a veto, 
leading to blockage of several dispute settlement processes and reverting the process 
to political dispute settlement. It was seen by many commentators as the most 
significant defect in the GATT dispute settlement procedures.9  
The DSU takes the opposite approach. Not only do WTO members have a right 
under Article 6.1 DSU to request a panel. A panel or AB decision, while formally 
requiring adoption by the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB) and thus a 
political organ,10 will by default be the final result as the winning party would have 
                                                            
8 GATT Contracting Parties, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Punta del este 
Declaration, 20 Sep 1986, GATT B.I.S.D.  
9 Jackson, supra note 1, at p. 68. 
10 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 Apr 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Article 2.1 [hereinafter DSU].  
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to object to the adoption of a ruling in its favor.11 This has never happened in the 
history of the WTO, the closest case being Australia – Automotive Leather involving 
subsidies. 12  Similarly, the authorization of retaliations follows this reverse or 
negative consensus rule.13  
The move from consensus to reverse consensus has important institutional 
implications: not only did it portend a “quasi-judicialization”14 of dispute settlement 
or the emergence of the AB as a “World Trade Court”.15 Potentially even more 
importantly, it was also a power shift from the political arena of the DSB to the more 
judicialized processes before panels or the AB.16 This power shift is at the center of 
criticism leveled by the US against the AB.  
3.1.2 Creation of the Appellate Body 
The drafters of the DSU did not foresee how crucial dispute settlement in general 
and the AB in particular would become in international trade governance. The AB 
functioned—from the very beginning—quite differently from how it was originally 
envisioned.  
The very institution of the AB as an appeals mechanism created a cultural change 
in how adjudication worked in the newly created WTO. For one, AB members 
showed considerably greater independence compared to panel members—
notwithstanding the repeated attempts by the US to undermine AB independence. 
This is due to AB members being appointed for once-renewable four year terms,17 
compared to the ad hoc appointments at the panel stage. 18  The long-term 
appointments, combined with institutional mechanisms such as the so-called 
exchange of views, further contributed to a consistent AB jurisprudence.  
AB decisions are taken by a division of three AB members.19 The exchange of 
views involves all sitting AB members and takes place prior to the finalization of a 
division’s report.20 Based on the principle of collegiality, the idea underlying the 
exchange of views is to “draw on the individual and collective expertise of all seven 
Members”.21 In the words of a former AB member, these meetings can be “bruising” 
                                                            
11 See id. at Articles 16.4, 17.14 and 22.6, respectively.  
12 Panel Report, Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather 
– Recourse To Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, para 6.48, WT/DS126/RW (21 Jan 
2000). The result was heavily criticized by WTO members, including both parties to the dispute and 
appellate proceedings were only not instituted as both parties had agreed not to do so. See Van den 
Bossche and Zdouc (2017) , p. 208. 
13 DSU, supra note 10, at Articles 6.1, 16.4, 17.14, and 22.6. 
14 Petersmann (1997), p. 186. 
15 See generally Ehlermann (2002). 
16 See generally on the difference between dispute settlement under the GATT and the WTO, Weiler 
(2001); Lang (2011), p. 18. 
17 DSU, supra note 10, at Article 17.2. 
18 Id. at Article 8.  
19 Id. at Article 17.1.  
20 Appellate Body, Working Procedure for Appellate Review, at Article 4(3), WT/AB/WP/6 (16 Aug 
2010) [hereinafter Working Procedure]. 
21 Id., at Article 4(1). See also Steger (2015), p. 457. 
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and “certainly expose weak reasoning”, with “every argument carefully assessed”.22 
Once the exchange of views has run its course, the division finalizes its report. It is 
not bound to follow the views of the AB members that are not part of the division 
deciding a case. The process has however been credited with providing a higher 
quality to AB reports, ensuring a higher degree of consistency of the AB case law on 
systemic, substantive and procedural issues, and the limited number of separate or 
dissenting opinions.23 The exchange of views thus also contributes to one of the 
fundamental goals of WTO dispute settlement, i.e. to “providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system”.24  
Perhaps most importantly, the AB functioned as a true appeals mechanism vis-
à-vis panel decisions. Initially, there was considerable apprehension about the 
prospect of a judicial system that would become overly powerful. According to one 
commentator, the negotiators’ purpose in introducing the appellate procedure was 
that the quasi-automatic adoption of panels reports described above would undergo a 
light touch check: an appellate mechanism against the occasional “bad” panel report. 
25 This was the tradeoff that some negotiating parties—particularly the European 
Union (hereinafter EU) and the US—were willing to make in order to remedy “bad” 
panel reports that both had been exposed to at the time.26  
It is worth bearing in mind that the AB was not envisioned as a standing 
institution at the time, but was to be used on an exceptional basis. This is evidenced 
by the fact that the members of the AB were not considered to have to work full-time, 
but rather could be remunerated on a retainer basis.27 But it quickly became clear that 
the AB took its role as a true appellate mechanism seriously. While mindful that its 
findings did not formally possess the power of stare decisis, the AB increasingly 
made it clear that prior decisions “provid[e] interpretative guidance for future 
panels”28. Subsequent decisions reinforced this position with the AB making its most 
commanding statement in this regard when it suggested that a panel decision 
deviating without reason from AB jurisprudence constituted a “[failure] to discharge 
its duties under Article 11 DSU.”29  
In addition to the institutional reforms just outlined – and partially because of 
these changes—the AB jurisprudence with respect to the relationship between the 
classic economic pursuits of the GATT era, namely trade liberalization, with negative 
externalities such as threats to human health or the environment, are additional 
hallmarks of the post-1995 era. This development was evident in the elevation of 
Article XX GATT as a counterpoint to the non-discrimination clauses of e.g. Articles 
                                                            
22 Unterhalter (2015), p. 471. 
23 Ehlermann (2005), pp. 477–478; Steger (2004), p. 44.  
24 DSU, supra note 10, at Article 3.2.  
25 Van den Bossche (2005), p. 64. See also Jackson (1997), p. 127.  
26 Van den Bossche (2006), p. 7. 
27  Dispute Settlement Body, Establishment of the Appellate Body, Recommendations by the 
Preparatory Committee for the WTO approved by the Dispute Settlement Body on 10 February 1995 , 
para 11-12, WT/DSB/1 (19 June 1995). 
28 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, para 107, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (22 Oct 2001). 
29 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measure on Stainess Steel from 
Mexico, para 162, WT/DS344/AB/R (30 Apr 2008). 
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I and III GATT,30 but also upon closer analysis of the quite different jurisprudence 
of the panels and AB in most SPS cases.31  
3.1.3 Summary  
Both reverse consensus and the creation of the AB are institutional mechanisms 
that had a profound effect on the WTO dispute settlement process. While this may 
not have been the “reflection of a grand design to create a strong, authoritative court 
that would be at the epicentre of the new WTO dispute settlement system”,32 it 
certainly has occupied that position from an early stage. Aware of the potential for a 
power shift from governmental decision-making that was at the heart of the GATT 
to one that balances power among different branches of the WTO’s constitutional 
system, AB members, from the very beginning, had an eye on balancing internal and 
external legitimacy. 33  This included grounding its jurisprudence—which was 
oftentimes quite far-reaching and sophisticated—as “textual” and thus resulting from 
the “ordinary meaning of words”, even though in practice the jurisprudence very 
much took account of the context in which its decisions were embedded. From its 
earliest decisions—in terms of style, content and self-understanding—the AB 
behaved like a high court.34 Thus its critique of the panel’s reasoning in the very first 
case that reached the AB—the Gasoline case35—was a harbinger of things to come. 
Over time the AB created—through a sophisticated jurisprudence—a heightened 
level of authority within the WTO, albeit one that was going to have to be 
continuously maintained.36   
3.2 Systemic importance of the AB in the WTO system: 
Contractarian v. Constitutional Views  
As pointed out above, the systemic importance of the AB within the WTO 
dispute settlement system cannot be overstated. But it is precisely this elevation of 
the apex institution of WTO dispute settlement compared to the GATT dispute 
settlement institutions that has caused considerable debate between almost 
exclusively the US on one side and the overwhelming number of remaining WTO 
                                                            
30 Cho and Kurtz (2018), p. 187. 
31 See generally Wagner (2011). 
32 Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centrepiece: The WTO Appellate Body and its Rise 
to Prominence in the World Trading System 67 (Faculty of L., U. of Maastricht Working Paper, 
2005). See also 67–79 for the reasons of the AB’s increased prominence.  
33 Weiler, supra note 16, at p. 200 et seq. 
34 See generally Ehlermann (2002) . 
35Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (29 Apr 1996). 
36 See generally Unterhalter, supra note 22 See also Graham (2014), p. 322; Shaffer et al. (2016), p. 
257. 
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members. The current debate about the future of the AB goes—in the words of a 
former AB member—to “the core and the nature of what the AB is or should not 
be”.37 
The former position holds that the WTO Agreement is best viewed as a 
contractual obligation, with the consequence that the language in any of the 
organization’s agreements should be interpreted narrowly and interpreters should be 
hewing closely to the negotiator’s intentions at the founding of the WTO.38 Most 
other WTO Members view the WTO Agreement as part of a trade constitution with 
the dispute settlement organs performing an independent function from the 
membership, empowered to resolve textual ambiguities.39 This debate is not as arcane 
as it may seem at first sight: 40  the former regards international agreements as 
perpetually negotiable instruments, while the latter considers the system working 
towards shared, collective goals of a global community. It is also not a criticism that 
is new to the WTO, but had already been leveled at GATT dispute panels in the early 
years of GATT dispute settlement.41 
If WTO law—as opposed to the early stages of the GATT era—was ever 
properly characterized as a contract,42 its founding treaty and the jurisprudence that 
was built on that foundation has moved well beyond that stage, and as far as can be 
observed, without principled opposition. Several factors are important in this context: 
the combination of institutional design factors laid out above; the imposition of 
constraints against unilateral action;43 a jurisprudence that takes the justifications 
contained in e.g. Article XX GATT seriously; and WTO Members’ acceptance of 
such jurisprudence—notwithstanding disagreement in particular cases. 44  These 
factors are an indication that the WTO is qualitatively different from the GATT not 
only institutionally, but also substantively and procedurally.45 This is particularly true 
for an institution which is dynamic and adapting to changing circumstances—be that 
                                                            
37 Ramírez-Hernández R (2018) Farewell speech of Appellate Body Member Ricardo Ramírez-
Hernández. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ricardoramirezfarwellspeech_e.htm. 
Accessed 3 Mar 2019. 
38  Lighthizer R (2017) U.S. Trade Policy Priorities: Robert Lighthizer, United States Trade 
Representative. https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-trade-policy-priorities-robert-lighthizer-united-sta 
tes-trade-representative. Accessed 31 Jan 2019 [hereinafter Robert Lighthizer]. 
39 Steinberg (2004), p. 271. 
40 Cohen H (2018) International Order between Governance and Contract, 1. http://bit.ly/GOCohen. 
Accessed 21 Feb 2019. 
41 Jackson, supra note 1, at p. 67. But see Steinberg, supra note 39, at pp. 256–257. 
42 One could read the AB’s finding in Japan–Alcoholic Beverages II, stating that “[t]he WTO 
Agreement is a treaty – the international equivalent of a contract”, in such a light. Appellate Body 
Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, p. 15, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (4 Oct 1996). 
43Steinberg, supra note 39, at p. 250. 
44 Creamer and Godzimirska (2016), p. 320; Howse (2016), pp. 11–12. 
45 See generally Bogdandy and Wagner (2006). Article III WTO Agreement is a positive reflection 
of the division of functions within–and thus the constitutional design of–the WTO. It outlines the–
albeit rather limited–executive (Article III:1 and III:4), as well as the legislative and adjudicative 
functions (Article III:2 and III:3, respectively). Article III:5, together with Article V, concerns the 
external relations of the WTO. 
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actual (such as accession of new members) or jurisprudential developments (as has 
been the case with Article XX GATT).46  
3.3 Failure of the WTO’s Legislative Arm 
The elevated position of the dispute settlement organs within the WTO are at 
least partially due to an almost complete lack of legislative action.47 This failure in 
the separation of powers within the WTO has arguably greatly contributed to the 
current impasse. The “crown jewel” of the WTO, its dispute settlement process 
could—and can—only shine as brightly because the other pillars within the WTO 
have not been fully functional.  
Since 1995 there has been little progress in updating the corpus of WTO rules. 
The Doha Round of Negotiations is formally still ongoing and according to the WTO, 
“its aim is to achieve major reform of the international trading system through the 
introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules”.48 However, a closer look 
at the legislative achievements in this period is sobering.  
3.3.1 Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
One of the major achievements is the Doha Ministerial Declaration on The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter 
TRIPS) and Public Health.49 The Declaration “recognizes the “gravity of the public 
health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially 
those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”, and 
WTO Members “agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health”.50  On that basis, WTO 
Members have “the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine 
the grounds upon which such licences are granted”.51 The result of the Declaration 
was an increase in the use of compulsory licenses for some time after its adoption, 
                                                            
46 Van Damme (2009), p. 313. 
47 See in this sense remarks by the WTO AB Chair Ujal Singh in 2018 on the occasion of the release 
of the 2017 AB Report. World Trade Organization (2018) “Unprecedented challenges” confront 
Appellate Body, chair warns. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ab_22jun18 _e.htm. 
Accessed 5 Mar 2019. 
48 World Trade Organization (2018) The Doha Round. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_ 
e/dda_e.htm. Accessed 25 Jan 2019. The latter element is geared towards improving the relative 
position of developing countries within the WTO and international trade in general. 
49 DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 20 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (20 Nov 2001). 
50 Id. at para 1. 
51 Id. at para 5 b.  
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but there now appears to be a low probability of continued such activity.52 That said, 
the Declaration—with the exception of provisions pertaining to developing countries 
without production capacity53—clarifies rather than changes the existing provisions 
of the TRIPS Agreement. It does however, set an interpretive baseline for WTO 
Members to find the proper balance between IP rights holders on the one hand and 
governments facing situations of epidemics on the other.54 This is evident when WTO 
Members “affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented 
in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”55  
3.3.2 Trade Facilitation Agreement 
The most significant new agreement since the WTO’s inception in 1995 is the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement (hereinafter TFA), which was concluded in 2013 and 
entered into force in February 2017.56 The TFA aims to facilitate the cross-border 
movement of goods (this includes expediting the movement, release and clearance of 
goods across borders as well as goods in transit), to cooperate more effectively 
between domestic authorities concerning customs compliance matters, and to provide 
for technical assistance and capacity building.57 This was predicted to reduce the time 
for border clearance for both imports and exports, thus decreasing the costs by 14.3 
per cent58 – with the largest gains being made by developing countries.59 The TFA 
replicates developments at the regional level where trade facilitation has played a 
more prominent role since the 1980s.60  
When the TFA came into force, the WTO Director-General welcomed this 
development almost effusively, calling it “the greatest trade reform for a 
generation”.61 While the TFA is a sign that the legislative mechanism of the WTO 
has not withered completely, it is far less ambitious than what appeared possible. If 
                                                            
52 Beall and Kuhn (2012) Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha 
Declaration: A Database Analysis. https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journ 
al.pmed.1001154. Accessed 25 Mar 2019. 
53 WTO Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 49, at para 6. 
54 Gathii (2002), p. 316. 
55  WTO Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 49, at para 4.  
56 World Trade Organization (2017) WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement enters into force. http 
s://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_31jan17_e.htm. Accessed 8 Aug 2017. 
57  See Trade Facilitation Agreement, Nov. 28, 2014, Articles 1 and 5, 7, 8–12, and 13–22, 
respectively.  
58 World Trade Organization (2017) Annual Report 2017, 72. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/b 
ooksp_e/anrep_e/anrep17_e.pdf. Accessed 8 Aug 2017. See also Arvis et al. (2013), p. 472. 
59 World Trade Organization (2015) World Trade Report 2015, 83. https://www.wto.org/english/re 
s_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report15_e.pdf. Accessed 26 Mar 2019. 
60 See generally Neufeld N (2014) Trade Facilitation Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: 
Traits and Trends, 5. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201401_e.pdf. Accessed 30 
Jan 2019. 
61 World Trade Organization (2017) From Vision to Reality: Event Celebrates Success of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_02jun17_e.htm. 
Accessed 8 Aug 2017.  
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an agreement such as the TFA is considered “ground-breaking”,62 it is clear that the 
ambition of the WTO has been scaled back considerably.  
3.3.3 Environmental Goods Agreement 
The Environmental Goods Agreement (hereinafter EGA) is an initiative that was 
launched in 2014, the underlying idea being the reduction of tariffs for goods that 
have environmental benefits on a plurilateral basis.63 These include solar panels, 
wind turbines and other energy-efficient products, but also technologies that address 
issues such as air pollution, waste and water management technologies.64 Building 
on an existing list of 54 environmental goods that was developed under the aegis of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (hereinafter APEC),65 it was to further the 
goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change as well as the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals by reducing the costs for these products. 66  18 
participants (representing a total of 46 WTO Members through the participation of 
the EU) were engaging in the negotiations which accounted for the majority of global 
trade in environmental goods.67 While the benefits of the EGA were to accrue to the 
entire WTO membership, the EGA’s future is unclear at this point as talks stalled in 
late 2016 over which goods should be covered by the agreement as well as phasing 
out periods.68 But even the agreed upon list of goods (comprising of roughly 300 
products) was modest: first, tariffs on most of these goods were low to begin with; 
                                                            
62 Id. 
63 This idea was already included in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration, which called for the 
“the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods 
and services”. See Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Declaration, at para 31, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
(20 Nov 2001). 
64 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2019) Environmental Goods 
Agreement. https://dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto/negotiations/ega/Pages/environmental-
goods-agreement.aspx. Accessed 30 Jan 2019. For a more expansive definition of environmental 
goods, see OECD and Statistical Office of the European Communities (1999), p. 9. The OCED 
posits: “The environmental goods and services industry consists of activities which produce goods 
and services to measure, prevent, limit, minimise or correct environmental damage to water, air and 
soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-systems. This includes cleaner technologies, 
products and services that reduce environmental risk and minimise pollution and resource use.”  
65 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (2012) ANNEX C – APEC List of Environmental Goods. 
https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2012/2012_aelm/2012_aelm_annex 
C.aspx. Accessed 30 Jan 2019. 
66 Araya M (2016) The Relevance of the Environmental Goods Agreement in Advancing the Paris 
Agreement Goals and SDGs: A Focus on Clean Energy and Costa Rica’s Experience, 8–10. 
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/the_relevance_of_the_environmental_goods_agre
ement_in_advancing_the_paris_agreement_goals_and_the_sdgs_0.pdf. Accessed 30 Jan 2019. 
67  World Trade Organization (2014) Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ega_e.htm. Accessed 26 Mar 2019.  
68 Reuters (2016) WTO environmental trade talks fail. https://www.reuters.com/article/trade-
environment-idINL5N1DZ0IJ. Accessed 30 Jan 2019; International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (2016) Ministerial Talks to Clinch Environmental Goods Agreement Hit 
Stumbling Block. https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/ministerial-talks-to-clinch-
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second the EGA negotiations did not tackle non-tariff barriers, subsidies, anti-
dumping policies, or intellectual property protections; finally, the environmental 
benefits were calculated as modest. 69  There is little doubt that lower tariff on 
environmental goods would be beneficial in order to allow for the easier spread of 
e.g. climate change averting technologies. It does not appear however that the major 
countries involved in this effort will be able to agree on a way forward in the near 
future.70  
3.3.4 Other Legislative Efforts  
Further efforts are currently underway, including an initiative on e-commerce71 
(following the broad and rather aspirational Chapter 14 CPTPP) and there appears to 
be space for more ambitious efforts to expand services negotiations.72 Progress in 
both areas would be especially important given the increasing importance of services 
in the global value chains and the relative decline of trade in goods-producing value 
chains.73  
3.4 Summary  
Taken together, these efforts—while laudable—are and this is putting it mildly, 
modest in comparison to the work that was carried out in the dispute settlement arm 
of the WTO. The US has suggested that language in some of the agreements within 
the WTO embodies “constructive ambiguity”, i.e. situations “where the negotiators 
leave unresolved particular issues by agreeing on language that does not resolve the 
issue and is capable of more than one interpretation”.74 Apart from the difficulty in 
distinguishing where such “constructive ambiguity” exists (and where it does not), 
Article 3.2 DSU makes it clear that the “dispute settlement system of the WTO is a 
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
                                                            
69 Cosbey A (2014) The Green Goods Agreement: Neither Green nor Good?, 1. 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/commentary_green_goods.pdf. Accessed 30 
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70  Sell M (2017) Climate and Trade Policy in a New Era: Options Ahead. https://www.icts 
d.org/opinion/climate-and-trade-policy-in-a-new-era-options-ahead. Accessed 30 Jan 2019. 
71 Kihara L (2019) Nearly Half WTO Members Agree to Talks on New E-commerce Rules. htt 
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72 World Trade Organization (2019) Services Negotiations. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/s 
erv_e/s_negs_e.htm. Accessed 14 Feb 2019. 
73  Lund S et al. (2019) Globalization In Transition: The Future of Trade and Value Chains. 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/innovation-and-growth/globalization-in-transition-th 
e-future-of-trade-and-value-chains. Accessed 14 Feb 2019. 
74  Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute 
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 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399300 
12 
system”. Panels and the AB would fall short of their duty to provide such security 
and predictability if they were to engage in selectively picking and choosing when an 
instance of “constructive ambiguity” actually exists (and where it does not). Rather 
than blaming the dispute settlement organs for engaging what the DSU mandates 
them to do, it is incumbent on WTO Members to engage in meaningful discussions 
of legislative reform.  
It goes without saying that reaching political consensus was a difficult task once 
the WTO was created in 1995. That said, the relatively meagre results of the 
legislative arm and the extensive jurisprudence—partially because WTO Members 
made considerable use of the WTO dispute settlement process—are evidence of the 
imbalance between these two pillars of the WTO. It is also worth bearing in mind 
that the judicial view and that of negotiators can sometimes be at odds: what AB 
members may rightly perceive as a clarification (as opposed to adding to or 
diminishing rights and obligations of WTO Members 75 ) has sometimes been 
understood as interpreting treaty language different from what was originally 
intended.76 
4. US Criticism over the AB  
The US has raised specific points of criticism vis-à-vis the WTO AB in late 2018. 
However, the US has had concerns about the role of the adjudicatory bodies well 
before the Trump administration came into power in January of 2017.77 This section 
will analyze the more general criticism of the WTO before turning to the specific 
concerns the US has regarding the AB. Some of these issues are genuine concerns 
that are best dealt with through a reform of the WTO. Other concerns appear less 
valid and are likely best understood as distractions.  
4.1 Criticism Against the WTO More Generally 
Beyond dispute settlement-specific issues, the US has made more general 
remarks critical of the multilateral trade governance currently in place within the 
WTO. Its criticism of the AB are best seen in light of these wider-reaching 
institutional as well as geostrategic concerns.  
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These include the aforementioned imbalance between the legislative and judicial 
arm by stating that “WTO is losing its essential focus on negotiation and becoming a 
litigation-centered organization”.78 In as much this criticism is valid, it can also be 
seen as an attempt to return to the power-based system that existed in the GATT years 
and that was at least partially overcome with the creation of the WTO in 1995.79 A 
second concern is the unclear definition of the term development within the WTO.80 
This is a long-standing issue within the WTO, as WTO Members self-declare whether 
they are developing countries. It is not only that drawing lines between these two 
categories is difficult, but the current system has ossified the divisions that existed at 
the founding of the WTO. A third criticism is the lack of notifications and 
transparency, which—in the eyes of the US—makes it impossible to negotiate new 
trade rules as the existing ones are not being followed.81 This is presumably an issue 
geared at WTO Members who fail to notify and provide transparency over their SPS, 
TBT and trade remedies obligations. 82  Finally, the US urges reforms of the 
substantive rules pertaining to “chronic overcapacity and the influence of state-
owned enterprises” as well as “addressing real-world problems such as SPS 
barriers”.83 The latter is an agricultural sector interest-driven appeal for less stringent 
SPS rules, such as those embodied in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and 
which have remained unchanged in the re-christened and slightly altered 
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.84 The former 
is a plea against the rise of mercantilism, specifically China’s pursuit of an economic 
model with a stronger emphasis on state involvement and control as well as the 
pursuit of these policies through subsidies, the creation of national champions, 
technology transfer, etc.85 The United States Trade Representative (hereinafter USTR) 
does not believe that the existing WTO rules enable other WTO Members to handle 
China’s rise and its accession to the WTO, arguing that more efficient markets are 
the way forward.86 It is this very issue that is at the heart of discussions currently 
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79 Jackson (2000), pp. 6–10. 
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underway between the China and the US in their bilateral trade negotiations and will 
likely be the defining issue for years to come.87 
4.2 Specific Criticism by the US Concerning the Role of the AB and 
WTO Members’ Responses  
While there has been discontent by the US for some time, it raised the most 
poignant and comprehensive set of criticism in a DSB meeting in late 2018. In that 
meeting, the US representative pointed out the following areas in which the US 
thought the AB overstepped its mandate. The US raised the following objections: (1) 
individuals who are no longer formally members of the AB continue to adjudicate 
disputes; (2) non-adherence to the 90-day deadline for issuing AB reports; (3) the use 
of obiter dicta in AB reports; (4) the AB’s misapplication of the standard of review; 
and (5) taking the view that AB reports have precedential effect.88 A further set of 
objections have been made in other fora, including “transparency issues”, “issues 
with the staff”, and the view that the “dispute-settlement process over the years has 
really diminished what we bargained for or imposed obligations that we do not 
believe we agreed to”.89  
4.2.1 Constitutional Backsliding I: Non-(Re)Appointments 
As mentioned before, US criticism towards the WTO overall and the AB in 
particular is not new. This is best exemplified through what can be seen as the 
beginning of the constitutional backsliding in the WTO, namely the history of non-
appointments or non-reappointments of individuals to the AB.90 In all three instances, 
                                                            
87 Mitchell T (2019) China to Rush through New Foreign Investment Law. https://www.f 
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89 Robert Lighthizer, supra note 38. 
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the US prevented the reappointment of an existing AB member or blocked the 
appointment process from the very beginning. Like most other decisions within the 
WTO, appointment and reappointment decisions are by consensus.91  
The first controversial case was that of US national Jennifer Hillman. Initially 
appointed in 2007 after serving as a member of the US International Trade 
Commission, the US refused to support her reappointment in 2011. To be sure, there 
is no guarantee for reappointment for AB membership. However, until then no sitting 
AB member had not been reappointed and Hillman could not serve another four year 
term ostensibly because she failed to defend US perspectives.92 This is despite the 
unambiguous language in the DSU and the Working Procedure for Appellate Review 
that AB members are “unaffiliated with any government”, that members “shall 
exercise [their] office without accepting or seeking instructions from any 
international, governmental, or non-governmental organization or any private 
source”, and that “[t]he Members constituting a division shall be selected on the basis 
of rotation, while taking into account the principles of random selection, 
unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to serve regardless of their national 
origin”.93 
The second instance of controversy was when the US blocked the appointment 
of Kenyan national James Gathii. The case is different from the Hillman episode in 
that Gathii, while teaching at a US law school, is not a US national. It is evident that 
the DSU and the Working Procedure for Appellate Review provisions are designed 
to prevent political influence on judicial decision-making. The same cannot be said 
for the appointment process as such, as that process has become increasingly 
political.94 It is worth noting that Gathii would have been the first and only black 
African on the AB, but appeared to not be politically palatable for the US, and 
specifically, the Office of the USTR.95  
The latest instance of US opposition to reappointment was that of former AB 
member Seung Wha Chang from Korea who served on the AB from 2012 until 2016. 
This situation was different from the two previous instances in that US blocked 
consensus for a non-US national who had served on the AB. The US opposed Chang 
because it did “not consider that his service reflects the role assigned to the Appellate 
Body by WTO Members in the WTO agreements”.96 The US seemed particularly 
concerned about Chang’s participation in AB reports, citing “systemic concerns 
about the disregard for the proper role of the Appellate Body”. This includes what 
the US considered obiter dicta or academic analysis, dealing with issues not raised 
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by parties to the dispute, inventing new legal standards, conducting independent 
investigations, and not exercising what the US considered proper deference to 
determinations under domestic law.97 Moreover, the US singled out Chang and thus 
one particular AB member whose term was about to expire, much to the consternation 
of other WTO Members as AB reports are confidential and are not attributable to any 
particular member of the division that has issued a report.98  
The reaction, more muted in the cases of Hillman (presumably because of her 
national origin) and Gathii (arguably, among other reasons, because his would have 
been an initial appointment and because his country of origin is not politically 
powerful), was uncharacteristically vociferous. Korea considered that any opposition 
to reappointments should only be for “compelling and legitimate” reasons; the EU 
said that the U.S. position created a “very serious” situation that may set a negative 
precedent for the AB reappointment process and that reappointment of WTO AB 
members should be “more or less automatic” if a member is able to serve a second 
term.99 Similarly, the Japanese delegation said the U.S. position was “extraordinary, 
exceptional in nature and [had] no precedent” and furthermore that “[a]ny act by a 
WTO member of this nature and magnitude must be exercised with extreme 
caution”.100 The Brazilian delegation said the justifications outlined by the U.S. “are 
very far from what would be considered acceptable reasons” and undermined the 
independence of AB members, suggesting that WTO Members should consider 
possibly amending the DSU.101  
The debate was not confined to WTO members. Not only did former AB 
members pen a letter, but the situation was considered serious enough that current 
AB members took the unprecedented step to enter the debate. All living former AB 
members, recognizing the political nature of the (re-)appointment process, remarked 
that the situation endangered the “impartial independence essential to upholding the 
rule of law” which had been “central to the success of the WTO dispute settlement 
system, which has in turn been central to the overall success of the WTO”.102 The 
main concern raised by the former AB members was that one individual had been 
singled out while all AB decisions had always been rendered as a division within the 
AB and after having gone through the exchange of views. This, in the eyes of the 
former AB members, put into jeopardy “all of the accomplishments of the past 
generation in establishing the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system” and 
opened up the “possibility of inappropriate pressures by participants in the WTO 
trading system”.103 The letter furthermore points out that “[t]here must be no opening 
whatsoever to the prospect of political interference in what must remain impartial 
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legal judgments in the WTO’s rule-based system of adjudication” and that if 
Members wished to adopt binding interpretations, the WTO Agreement gives that 
competence to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council under Article XI:2 
WTO Agreement.104  
The – at the time: six – sitting AB members also addressed the DSB in a letter, 
albeit with a slightly more guarded tone: “The dispute settlement system depends on 
WTO Members trusting the independence and impartiality of Appellate Body 
Members. Linking the reappointment of a Member to specific case could affect that 
trust.”105 What is remarkable is not the substance – even though some of the points 
were disputed and criticized by the US representative. 106  Rather and given the 
political nature of the process ongoing at the time, it was the fact of the intervention 
itself. Clearly, the sitting AB members saw the very institution that they represented 
threatened to the point that they felt compelled to voice their concerns.  
4.2.2 Constitutional Backsliding II: The Reaction – Too Little, Too Late? 
Each of these situations was, in and of itself, serious to warrant more somber 
consideration of the future of the WTO dispute settlement arm. The reality is that the 
constitutional backsliding is not a recent phenomenon but has begun quite some time 
ago. The damage done, other WTO members were either unable or unwilling to 
challenge the US which—in an ironic twist—had been the driving force behind the 
creation of an independent and impartial judicial arm at the WTO’s creation.107 There 
appeared to be a more unified opposition by WTO Members against the US tactics 
in the last instance, but this has not prevented the current situation in which the AB 
consists of only three members (Ujal Singh Bhatia, Thomas Graham and Hong 
Zhao).108  
Numerous suggestions have emerged as to how to deal with the current situation. 
Some are more detail-oriented proposals such as limiting the time that AB members 
can serve after their term has expired or for outgoing AB members to serve until their 
replacement has been agreed upon; 109  the Appellate Body could refuse to hear 
cases; 110  a separate or modified system for trade remedies (arguably the major 
substantive concern for the US);111 Members could have recourse to majority voting 
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instead of the default consensus option in WTO decision-making; 112  disputing 
Members could agree ex ante to refrain from appealing a panel decision;113 arbitration 
under Article 25 DSU in lieu of appeals to the AB;114 the introduction of a legislative 
remand, ie a requirement that panels or the AB would submit issues of legal 
uncertainty to WTO committees for further discussion and negotiation;115 all the way 
to outsourcing appellate decision-making to an extra-WTO institution with 
essentially the same rules and personnel as are currently in place.116  
Formal reform proposals have been lodged by various groupings within the 
WTO. The so-called Ottawa Group of 13 like-minded WTO Members, both 
developing and developed, released a statement pointing out the duty of all WTO 
Members to “safeguard the WTO dispute settlement system”, including “to hold 
solution-oriented discussions with a view to restoring a fully operational Appellate 
Body without delay”.117 This document referenced an earlier proposal by various 
WTO Members which sets out concrete proposals on the issues raised by the US, 
including transitional rules pertaining to outgoing AB members; the length of 
appellate review; the meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact; the matter of 
obiter dicta in AB reports; annual meetings between the AB and the DSB “to provide 
an additional ‘channel of communication’ where concerns with regard to some 
Appellate Body approaches, systemic issues or trends in the jurisprudence could be 
voiced”;118 as well as the issue of precedent.119 Another communication submitted by 
the EU, China India and Montenegro contained proposals that built on and went 
further than the previously mentioned document, putting forth a single 6-8 year long 
term for AB members in order to “enhance the independence of the AB and its 
members”; increase the number of AB members from 7 to 9 in order to improve 
efficiency and geographical balance; making AB membership an exclusive 
occupation; expanding the resources for the AB and its Secretariat; and an automatic 
launch of the selection process to replace outgoing AB members.120  
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These proposals—in part as direct rejoinders to US criticism—received, at best, 
a lukewarm response from the US which went as far as stating that “[w]ith respect to 
the proposal advanced by the EU, China, and India, it is hard to see how it in any way 
responds to the concerns raised by the US, as some have alleged.”121 It furthermore 
responded that “on a close reading, the proposals would not effectively address the 
concerns that Members have raised” and rather “endorse changing the rules to 
accommodate and authorize the very approaches that have given rise” to its 
concerns.122  
Given these events it seems clear that good faith negotiations on meaningful 
reform of the WTO dispute settlement system is challenging at best and illusive at 
worst.123 It is hard to reconcile these competing positions or synthesize them into a 
blueprint for a future dispute settlement process on the multilateral level, short of one 
side giving up some of their fundamental—though not necessarily genuine—
demands.  
5. Conclusion  
The apparent slow demise of the appellate function—and with it most likely the 
entire adjudicative function of the WTO—will have considerable institutional 
ramifications. Barring any new developments, the AB will cease to function no later 
than December 2019 when the number of AB members will dip below the requisite 
three to adjudicate disputes. If this comes to pass, the AB will have regressed—from 
the “centrepiece” it was after the WTO’s creation—into irrelevance. While some of 
the criticism raised shouldn’t be brushed aside, the AB is caught in a perfect storm of 
competing visions for international economic governance well beyond its control, 
and a US administration that appears opposed to multilateral institutions at best and 
belligerent towards them at worst. The US has long criticized the AB’s position in 
the area of trade remedies, and the ascent of Robert Lighthizer to the position of 
USTR has only added fuel to the fire of these efforts.  
The attempts to dismantle the existing system of dispute settlement are therefore 
borne out of a sense of frustration at the AB not falling in line with the US’ position 
and desire to return to a power-based system of trade governance.124 But in another 
                                                            
121 United States, supra note 88. 
122 Id. 
123 In the context of the–failed, due to US opposition—re-appointment of former AB member 
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pointed to their grievances, but not laid out in any meaningful way what exactly are the changes 
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sense the AB is collateral damage in a larger battle over the future of international 
trade governance. The AB has been thrust into an exposed and vulnerable position 
partly because of the paralyzed negotiating function of the WTO by the very members 
that are unable to secure a negotiated settlement for contentious issues. Fixing 
technical legal issues within the DSU over the proper position of the AB in WTO 
dispute settlement will likely prove futile in this larger game.125 The bigger questions 
that have remained unresolved are indeed best dealt with at a political level, provided 
that they are approached in good faith.126 Some of these existed prior to China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, some have emerged since. At the heart of the current 
crisis lies the question of competing models: the market-oriented traditional model 
versus Chinese state capitalism in tandem with the specific distortions it causes.127 
This central concern is not only relevant for the US, but also many of its (erstwhile) 
allies in the multilateral trading system.  
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